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Abstract—Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm
for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental
component of this approach is the design of agents’ local utility
functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a
desirable collective behavior. In this work we focus on a well-
studied class of distributed resource allocation problems where
each agent is requested to select a subset of resources with
the goal of optimizing a given system-level objective, separable
over the resources. Our core contribution is the development
of a novel framework to tightly characterize the worst case
performance of any resulting Nash equilibrium (price of anarchy)
as a function of the chosen agents’ utility functions. Leveraging
this result, we then identify how to design such utilities so as
to optimize the price of anarchy through a tractable linear
program. This provides us with a-priori performance certificates
applicable to any existing learning algorithm capable of driving
the system to an equilibrium. Part II of this work specializes these
results to submodular and supermodular objectives, discusses the
complexity of computing Nash equilibria, and provides multiple
illustrations of the theoretical findings.
Index Terms– Game theory, distributed optimization, resource
allocation, combinatorial optimization, price of anarchy.
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIAGENT systems have enormous potential forsolving many of the current societal challenges. Robotic
networks can operate in post-disaster environments and reduce
the impact of industrial or natural calamities [1], [2]. They
have the potential to increase the food production and to
reduce the water consumption [3]. Fleets of autonomous cars
are forecasted to revolutionize the mobility, to reduce traffic
congestion as well as pollutant emissions [4]. On a smaller
scale, swarms of medical “microbots” promise groundbreaking
results by means of local drug delivery [5] or microsurgery [6].
The main challenge in controlling such systems is to design
local decision rules for the individual subsystems to guar-
antee that the collective behaviour is desirable with respect
to a global objective [7]. The spatial distribution, privacy
requirements, scale, and quantity of information associated
with typical networked systems do not allow for centralized
communication and decision making, but require instead the
use of distributed protocols. That is, the agents in the system
must make decisions independently in response to available in-
formation. Such problems are typically posed as optimization
problems (finite or infinite dimensional), where the system-
level objective is captured by an objective function, while
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physical laws and informational availability are incorporated
as constraints on the decision variables [8], [9]. One common
approach for deriving admissible algorithms is to distribute
existing centralized optimization schemes by leveraging the
structure of the given problem, e.g., distributed gradient ascent,
primal-dual and Newton’s method, among others [10], [11].
An alternative approach, termed game design, has es-
tablished itself as a valuable set of tools to complement
these more traditional techniques [12]. Rather than directly
specifying a decision-making process, local utility functions
are assigned to the the agents, so that their self-interested
optimization translates in the achievement of the system-level
objective; see Figure 1 for an overview of the approach. The
motivation for studying equilibria of such games, as opposed
to equilibria of a dynamical process, stems from the existence
of readily available distributed learning algorithms that can
be utilized to the drive the collective behavior to a Nash
equilibrium in a given game [12]–[19]. When the agent utility
functions are set to be equal to the system-level objective,
the resulting algorithms and performance guarantees resemble
the centralized optimization methodologies discussed above.
The value of the game design approach emerges when the
designed agent utility functions are not equal to the system-
level objective. In fact, we demonstrate the non-intuitive fact
that having agents respond to local utility functions that do not
reproduce the system-level objective significantly improves the
efficiency guarantees of the resulting collective behavior.
Optimization problem
Game design
1) Utility design:
- assign utility functions to each agent
- choose equilibrium concept
- lower bound the equilibrium efficiency
2) Algorithm design:
- devise distributed algorithm guiding
agents to chosen equilibrium concept
Distributed algorithm with
performance guarantees
Fig. 1. Game theoretic approach for the design of distributed algorithms.
The core of this work centers on characterizing the relation-
ship between the agents’ utility functions and the efficiency
of the emergent collective behavior, that is, this work focus
on the utility design step depicted in Figure 1. We model the
emergent collective behavior as a pure Nash equilibrium of the
game defined by the agents’ utility functions, and measure the
corresponding efficiency with the notion of price of anarchy
[20]. The price of anarchy provides performance guarantees
associated with the worst performing Nash equilibrium of the
designed game, relative to the optimal performance.
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2Related Works. There has been extensive research in the field
of algorithmic game theory focused on analyzing the price
of anarchy, as well as other efficiency measures such as the
price of stability [20], [21] and price of stochastic anarchy
[22]. However, most of the results are purely analytical and
do not properly address the design questions considered in this
manuscript. One noteworthy result involves the widely studied
smoothness framework, which provides a general approach - in
the form of an inequality constraint involving the utility func-
tions - to bound the price of anarchy [23]. Inspired by this line
of work, [24]–[27] developed mathematical programs aimed at
deriving bounds on the price of anarchy by incorporating this
constraint. Unfortunately, we show in Section III that the price
of anarchy bounds associated with the smoothness framework
are relevant only when the agents’ utility functions are budget-
balanced, i.e., the sum of the agents’ objective is equal to the
system-level objective. While this constraint is well justified
for a number of problems modeled through game theory (e.g.,
cost sharing games [28]), it has little bearing on the design of
local utility functions in multiagent systems, as studied here.
Much less is known about tight price of anarchy guarantees
outside of the case of budget-balanced objectives, with the
exception of some specific problem domains including cov-
erage problems [29] and resource allocation problems with
convex costs or concave welfare [30], [31]. We note that all
the aforementioned approaches based on the reformulation of
the smoothness condition through mathematical programming
techniques [24]–[27] result in optimization problems whose
size is exponential in the number of agents and in the number
of strategies available to each agent. Some of these works even
require prior knowledge on the structure of the worst case
instances, e.g., [25]. On the contrary our approach produces a
linear program whose size does not depend on the number of
agents’ strategies, and grows only linearly in the number of
agents. Just as importantly, our linear program automatically
discovers the structure of the worst case instances.
Contributions. This paper generalizes the afore-mentioned
application specific results by developing methodologies for
game design in a well-studied class of distributed resource
allocation problems, where each agent selects a subset of
resources with the goal of maximizing a system-level objec-
tive function that is separable over the resources. The main
contributions of this paper include the following:
1) We show that the smoothness framework typically used to
bound the price of anarchy is not suited for the utility de-
sign problems considered, as the corresponding efficiency
bounds are conservative (Theorem 1).
2) We resolve the problem of computing the exact (i.e., tight)
price of anarchy by means of a tractable linear program in
its primal and dual form (Theorems 2 and 3). The latter
program features only 2 decision variables and O(n2),
where n is the number of agents in the original optimization
problem. Such program can be solved efficiently.
3) We solve the problem of designing agent utility functions
so as to optimize the resulting price of anarchy. We show
that this problem can be posed as a tractable linear program
in n+ 1 variables and O(n2) constraints (Theorem 4).
Part II demonstrates the breadth of the approach by special-
izing these results to the class of submodular and supermodular
resource allocation problems. In this context, we show how
our approach subsumes and generalizes existing fragmented
results. We conclude Part II by showcasing the applicability
of our techniques by means of two applications.
Organization. Section II contains the model, the game the-
oretic approach, and the corresponding performance metrics.
Section III shows the inapplicability of the smoothness frame-
work to the utility design problem considered. Sections IV and
V show how to reformulate the problems of characterizing and
optimizing the price of anarchy as tractable linear programs.
Notation. For any two positive integers p ≤ q, denote [p] =
{1, . . . , p} and [p, q] = {p, . . . , q}. We use N, R>0 and R≥0
to denote the set of natural numbers, positive and non negative
real numbers, respectively. Given a finite set I, |I| denotes its
cardinality; e represents Euler’s number.
II. MODEL AND PERFORMANCE METRICS
A. Problem formulation
In this paper we consider a framework for distributed
resource allocation. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of agents,
and R = {r1, . . . , rm} be a set of resources, with n,m ∈ N.
Each resource r ∈ R is associated with a local welfare
function Wr : [n] → R that captures the welfare accrued at
each resource as a function of the utilization, i.e., Wr(j) is the
welfare generated at resource r if there are j agents utilizing
that resource. Finally, each agent i ∈ N is associated with
an admissible choice set Ai ⊆ 2R. The goal of the system
designer is to find an allocation a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ A =
A1×· · ·×An optimizing a system-level objective of the form
W (a) =
∑
r∈∪iai
Wr(|a|r), (1)
where |a|r denotes the number of agents choosing resource r
in allocation a, i.e., the cardinality of the set {i ∈ N : r ∈
ai}. We will often use a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an) to
denote the decision of all the agents but i.
Example 1 (Vehicle-target assignment / maximum coverage).
Consider the classic vehicle-target assignment problem [32].
In this problem there are a set T of targets, each associated to
its importance vt ≥ 0, and a set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Each agent i ∈ N is given a set of possible assignments Ai ⊆
2T , and a common success probability p ∈ [0, 1]. The goal is
to determine an admissible vehicle-target assignment a ∈ A
to maximize the value of acquired targets, as expressed by
W (a) =
∑
t∈∪iai
vt
(
1− (1− p)|a|t
)
. (2)
An important case of vehicle-target assignment problem that
warrants independent attention is the well-studied maximum
coverage problem [33]. In a weighted maximum coverage
problem all agents have identical sets Ai = A¯ ⊆ 2T . The
goal is to select n subsets from A¯ to maximize the total weight
of covered elements. This is obtained setting p = 1 in (2).
3Example 2 (Routing through a shared network). Consider the
classic routing problem given in [34]. In this problem a set N
of users utilizes a common network comprised of a set of edges
E, where each edge e ∈ E is associated to a cost function ce :
{1, . . . , n} → R. The term ce(j) captures the quality of service
(or latency) on edge e if there are j ≥ 1 users sharing that
edge. Each user i ∈ N is associated with a given source and
destination, which defines a set Ai ⊆ 2E of admissible paths.
The goal of the system designer is to determine an allocation
a ∈ A of users to the network to optimize the total congestion
W (a) = −
∑
e∈∪iai
|a|e · ce(|a|e). (3)
From this point on, we consider resource allocation problems
where the welfare functions satisfies Wr(j) ≥ 0 for all j ≥ 1,
and thus W (a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A. The case of W (a) ≤ 0
for all a ∈ A falls under the framework of cost minimization.
While we do not explicitly delve into the framework of cost
minimization here, all of the forthcoming results have an
analogous result that holds for the cost minimization setting.
B. Local utility design and the price of anarchy
Within the combinatorial framework studied in this paper,
finding a feasible allocation maximizing (1) is known to
be an intractable problem. Based on such observation, this
work focus on deriving efficient and distributed algorithms
for attaining approximate solutions to the maximization of (1).
While for specific classes of problems centralized algorithms
are available [33], the focus is placed here on distribued
algorithms. In this respect, each agent i ∈ N is requested to
make independent choices in response to pieces of information
only regarding the resources he can select, i.e., ri ∈ Ai.
Rather than directly specifying a decision-making process,
we adopt the framework of game theory and utility design.
Here, each agent i ∈ N is associated with a utility function of
the form Ui : A → R that guides their individual behavior. We
focus on the following class of local agent objective functions
where for any agent i ∈ N and allocation a ∈ A we let
Ui(a) =
∑
r∈ai
fr(|a|r), (4)
and fr : {1, . . . , n} → R defines the utility each agent receives
at resource r as a function of the number of agents selecting
that resource in the allocation a. We refer to {fr}r∈R as the
utility generating functions since each agent utility is fully
determined once {fr}r∈R are specified. We refer to one such
game with the tuple G = (N,R,A, {Wr}r∈R, {fr}r∈R).
The core of this work is on analyzing the efficiency of the
equilibria associated with the game generated by {fr}r∈R
according to the utility functions (4) and the system-level
objective in (1). We focus on the notion of Nash equilibrium,
which is guaranteed to exist for any game G with utility
functions (4), thanks to the fact that G is a potential game [35].
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium, [36]). An allocation ane ∈ A
is a pure Nash equilibrium if Ui(ane) ≥ Ui(ai, ane−i) for all
alternative allocations ai ∈ Ai and for all agents i ∈ N .
We characterize the efficiency of a Nash equilibrium - which
we refer to as simply an equilibrium - using the notion of price
of anarchy (PoA). The price of anarchy of an instance G is de-
fined as the ratio between the welfare at the worst performing
Nash equilibrium, and the maximum attainable welfare [20].1
Price of anarchy guarantees are particularly impactful when
extended from a single game G to a family of games G; how-
ever, defining a family of games requires defining the utility
generating functions for each game instance. Here, we focus
on the case where a system designer is unaware of the structure
of the specific resource allocation problem. In particular, we
assume the system designer is unaware of the exact number of
agents, the number of resources, and the agents’ action sets.
The only information a priori available to the system designer
is the setW describing the possible welfare functions utilized,
i.e., Wr ∈ W for all resources. This request stems from the
observation that the previous pieces of information may be
unreliable, or unavailable to the system designer due to, e.g.,
communication restrictions or privacy concerns. Given this
uncertainty, we consider the case where the system designer
commits a priori to a specific utility generating function for
each welfare functions Wr ∈ W , which we express by
fr = F(Wr). The realized resource allocation problem merely
employs the utility generating functions {F(Wr)}r∈R. The
map F constitutes our design choice, and we refer to it as the
utility generating mechanism. We denote with GF,W the set of
games induced by F , i.e., any game G ∈ GF,W is of the form
G = (N,R,A, {Wr}r∈R, {F(Wr)}r∈R), (5)
where N is any set of agents, R is any set of resources, A
is any allocation set, and {Wr}r∈R is any tuple of functions
satisfying Wr ∈ W . The price of anarchy of the family of
games GF,W is defined as the worst case over G ∈ GF,W , i.e.,
PoA(F ,W) = inf
G∈GF,W
(
mina∈NE(G)W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
)
. (6)
where NE(G) denotes the set of equilibria of G. While
the function W also depends on the instance G considered,
we do not indicate it explicitly, to simplify notation. The
quantity PoA(F ,W) characterizes the efficiency of the worst
performing equilibrium relative to the corresponding optimal
allocation, over all possible instances in GF,W . In the non-
degenerate cases where maxa∈AW (a) > 0, it holds 0 ≤
PoA(F ,W) ≤ 1, and the higher the price of anarchy, the
better performance certificates we can offer. Observe that when
an algorithm is available to compute one such equilibrium, the
price of anarchy also represents the approximation ratio of the
corresponding algorithm over all the instances in GF,W .
1The choice of Nash equilibrium provides us with potentially better perfor-
mance guarantees compared to what offered by more permissive - but easier
to compute - equilibrium notions, e.g., coarse correlated equilibrium [37]. In-
deed, since every Nash equilibrium is also a coarse correlated equilibrium, the
worst performing coarse correlated equilibrium yields a system-level objective
that is no better than that of the worst performing Nash equilibrium. The
drawback of this choice stems from the intractability of Nash equilibria, which
are hard to compute (PLS-complete, [38]) even for the class of congestion
games to which G belongs to. Nevertheless, under structural assumptions
on the sets {Ai}i∈N similar to those used in combinatorial optimization,
computing a Nash equilibrium is a polynomial task (See Proposition 2 in Part
II). Finally, the guarantees offered by Nash equilibria are deterministic.
4Example 1 revisited (Vehicle-target assignment). Consider
the vehicle-target assignment problem of Example 1. Define
W as the set containing only welfare functions of the form
Wr(j) = vr · (1− (1− p)j), ∀j ∈ N. (7)
for all vr ≥ 0, p ∈ [0, 1]. Further, consider a utility generating
mechanism Fmc, known as the marginal contribution, where
for any Wr ∈ W we have fmcr = Fmc(Wr) with
fmcr (j) = vr · p · (1− p)j−1, ∀j ∈ N. (8)
Note that the utility generating mechanism provided in (8)
results in a well-defined game for any instance of the vehicle-
target assignment problem given Example 1. Furthermore,
it is shown in [13] that PoA(Fmc,W) = 1/2, meaning
that regardless of the underlying vehicle-target assignment
problem, all equilibria are guaranteed a performance within
50% of optimal. This paper will develop a framework to design
the best possible utility generating mechanism, and accompany
that with a performance certificate significantly beyond 50%.
We decompose the utility design problem in two tasks:
i) providing a bound (or ideally an exact characterization)
of the price of anarchy as a function of F and W;
ii) optimizing this expression over all mechanisms F .
In Section IV we address i), while in Section V we turn the
attention to ii). Before doing so, we show that the existing
smoothness approach is unsuitable for the purpose.
III. SMOOTHNESS AND ITS LIMITATIONS
There has been significant research attention geared at
analyzing the price of anarchy for various classes of games.
One approach that is commonly employed for this purpose
is termed smoothness [23]. The framework of smoothness
provides a technique to bound the price of anarchy of a given
game G by devising parameters λ, µ ≥ 0 that satisfy∑
i∈N
Ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a), ∀a, a′ ∈ A. (9)
We refer to a game fulfilling (9) as (λ, µ)-smooth. If a game
G is (λ, µ)-smooth and
∑
i Ui(a) ≤W (a) for all a ∈ A, [23]
proves that the price of anarchy of G is lower bounded by
mina∈NE(G)W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
≥ λ
1 + µ
. (10)
A similar argument can be used to lower bound the price of
anarchy for the family GF,W introduced in Section II. In this
respect, for any given utility generating mechanism F , the
best bound on the price of anarchy (6) that can be derived via
smoothness is given by the solution to the following program
RPoA(F ,W)= sup
λ,µ≥0
{
λ
1 + µ
s.t. (λ, µ) satisfy (9), ∀G ∈ GF,W
}
.
(11)
The term RPoA(F ,W) lower bounds PoA(F ,W), and is
often referred to as the robust price of anarchy [23]. Note that
the smoothness framework forces us to restrict the attention
to mechanisms whose corresponding utilities satisfy∑
i∈N
Ui(a) ≤W (a), ∀a ∈ A,∀G ∈ GF,W , (12)
else no guarantee is provided by [23]. Thus, in the remaining
of this section only, we consider utilities satisfying (12).
At first glance it appears that the smoothness framework
could be extremely beneficial for characterizing the price of
anarchy associated with different utility generating mecha-
nisms. Unfortunately, the following proposition demonstrates
a significant weakness associated with this framework.
Theorem 1 (Limitations of the smoothness framework).
i) Consider the classes of games GF,W and GF ′,W differing
solely for the choice of the mechanisms. Denote with
{Ui}i∈N and {U ′i}i∈N the utilities (4) obtained with
fr = F(Wr), and f ′r = F ′(Wr), respectively. Assume
that both {Ui}i∈N and {U ′i}i∈N satisfy (12). If U ′i(a) ≤
Ui(a) for all i ∈ N , a ∈ A, G ∈ GF,W , then
RPoA(F ′,W) ≤ RPoA(F ,W). (13)
ii) The best bound on the price of anarchy that can be
obtained using a smoothness argument is provided
by a mechanism that is budget balanced, i.e., whose
resulting utilities satisfy (12) with equality. The unique
mechanism satisfying this constraint for all instances is
Fes(Wr) = f es, with f es(j) = Wr(j)/j, ∀j ∈ N.
iii) Consider the weighted maximum coverage problem of
Example 1, i.e., let W contain only functions of the form
Wr(j) = vr for any vr ≥ 0, j ∈ N, and compare the
mechanisms Fes(Wr) = f esr with F?(Wr) = f?r , where
f esr (j) = vr ·
1
j
, ∀j ∈ N,
f?r (j) = vr ·
(j − 1)!
e− 1 ·
(
e−
j−1∑
i=0
1
i!
)
, ∀j ∈ N.
For any mechanism F , the best bound on the price of an-
archy that can be derived with a smoothness argument is
RPoA(F ,W) ≤ RPoA(Fes,W) = 1
2
.
Nevertheless, F? has better price of anarchy than Fes, as
PoA(F?,W) = 1− 1
e
>
1
2
= PoA(Fes,W).
The first claim highlights the fact that one can never improve
the robust price of anarchy by lowering the agents utility func-
tions from their budget-balanced level, i.e., the case when (12)
holds with equality. As a consequence, the utility generating
mechanism that gives the best smoothness guarantee must
be budget balanced. The third claim demonstrates that such
conclusion does not carry over to the true price of anarchy
(6), thereby highlighting a significant discrepancy between the
robust price of anarchy and the price of anarchy outside the
budget-balanced regime. Indeed, the utilities corresponding to
F? satisfy (12) with strict inequality, and yet the mechanism
F? has a significantly better price of anarchy than that of Fes,
unlike predicted by the smoothness framework.2
2While the results of Theorem 1 are stated with respect to Nash equilibria,
identical conclusions hold for the broader class of coarse correlated equilibria.
5IV. CHARACTERIZING THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section we develop a novel framework to characterize
the price of anarchy in both budget-balanced and non-budget-
balanced regimes. Specifically, we show how to compute the
price of anarchy throug a tractable linear program (LP).
In the forthcoming presentation we focus on distributed
resource allocation problems where the system-level objective
is as in (1) and the local welfare functions are of the form
Wr(j) = vr · w(j), w(j) > 0, ∀j ∈ N, (14)
with vr ≥ 0. The function w : {1, . . . , n} → R>0 is fixed,
and referred to as welfare basis function. Since w associates a
positive real number to every integer number {1, . . . , n}, we
often denote w as a vector in Rn>0. The quantity vr can be
interpreted as the value of the corresponding resource r ∈ R,
while w scales such value depending on how many agents
selected it. In this context, the set W contains only functions
of the form (14) for all possible values vr ∈ R≥0. The vehicle-
targets assignment and the weighted maximum coverage prob-
lems of Example 1 are of this form. Other problems that can
be casted within this framework include - but are not limited -
to content distribution in wireless networks [39], information-
decoding in noisy channel, combinatorial auctions [40].
Given local welfare functions as in (14), we focus on
mechanisms that are linear in their argument, i.e., for which
F(vr · w) = vr · F(w), ∀vr ≥ 0. (15)
We define f = F(w), where f : {1, . . . , n} → R is hereafter
our only design choice. Since f associates a real number to
every integer number {1, . . . , n}, we often denote f as a vector
in Rn.
Definition 2. We define Gnf,w as the set of gamesG∈GF,W s.t.
i) W contains only functions of form (14), F is as in (15);
ii) the number of agents is upper bounded by |N | ≤ n;
iii) the optimum value satisfies maxa∈AW (a) > 0;
We denote the price of anarchy of the class Gnf,w with
PoA(f, w, n),
as it is completely determined by f , w and n.
A. The linear program reformulation
We are now ready to state our first main contribution which
characterizes the price of anarchy PoA(f, w, n) of the set of
resource allocations games Gnf,w introduced in Definition 2.
While both w and f are defined over the domain {1, . . . , n},
we artificially set the non-valid extremum points as f(0) =
w(0) = f(n+1) = w(n+1) = 0, for notational convenience,
else, e.g., f(a+ x+ 1) appearing in (17) will not be defined
for a+ x = n. Additionally, we define the set
I := {(a, x, b) ∈ N3≥0 s.t. 1 ≤ a+ x+ b ≤ n} ,
and write
∑
a,x,b instead of
∑
(a,x,b)∈I . Finally, we associate
to each tuple (a, x, b) ∈ I, the decision variable θ(a, x, b) ∈ R.
Theorem 2 (PoA as a linear program). Let w ∈ Rn>0 be a
welfare basis function, and let f ∈ Rn.
i) If f(1) ≤ 0, then PoA(f, w, n) = 0 for any n ∈ N.
ii) If instead f(1) > 0, n ∈ N, the price of anarchy is
PoA(f, w, n) =
1
W ?
, (16)
where W ? is the (finite) value of the following (primal)
linear program in the unknowns {θ(a, x, b)}(a,x,b)∈I ,
W ?= max
θ(a,x,b)
∑
a,x,b
w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b)
s.t.
∑
a,x,b
[af(a+x)− bf(a+x+1)]θ(a, x, b)≥0,∑
a,x,b
w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1,
θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0, ∀(a, x, b) ∈ I.
(17)
Given f = F(w), the solution of (17) returns both the price
of anarchy, and the corresponding worst case instance encoded
in θ(a, x, b) (see the proof in the Appendix). Observe that
the number of decision variables is |I| ∼ O(n3), while only
two scalar constraints are present (neglecting the positivity
constraint). The previous program can thus already be solved
efficiently. Nevertheless, we are interested in the expression of
PoA(f, w, n) (i.e., in the value W ?), and therefore consider
the dual of (17) in Subsection IV-C. Before doing so, the next
subsection provides intuition on the proof of Theorem 2.
B. Outline of Proof
While Equation (6) corresponds to the definition of price of
anarchy, it also describes a (seemingly difficult) optimization
problem. The goal of this subsection, is to give an informal
introduction on how this optimization problem can be trans-
formed into a finite dimensional LP. The non-interested reader
can move forward to the next subsection. We discuss here the
case of f(1) > 0, as showing that PoA(f, w, n) = 0 whenever
f(1) ≤ 0 is immediate (see the Appendix). Additionally, we
consider only games G ∈ Gnf,w with exactly n agents. This
is without loss of generality, as the price of anarchy over the
class of games with |N | ≤ n agents is the same of that over
the class of games with |N | = n agents.3
Step 1: we observe that the price of anarchy computed
over the family of games G ∈ Gnf,w is the same of the price
of anarchy over a reduced family of games, denoted with
Gˆnf,w, where the feasible set of every player only contains
two allocations: worst-performing equilibrium and optimal
allocation, that is Aˆi = {anei , aopti }, and definition (6) becomes
PoA(f, w, n) = inf
G∈Gˆnf,w
(
W (ane)
W (aopt)
)
,
s.t. Ui(ane) ≥ Ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
where we have constrained ane to be an equilibrium. We do
not include the additional constraints requiring ane to be the
3To see this, note that the price of anarchy of any game with p players
p < n can be obtained as the price of anarchy of a corresponding game with
n players where we simply set Ai = ∅ for the additional n− p players.
6worst-performing equilibrium and aopt to provide the highest
welfare. Taking the infimum over Gˆnf,w will ensure this.
Step 2: we show that the price of anarchy over the class of
games Gˆnf,w remains unchanged if we introduce the additional
constraint W (ane) = 1. Thus (6) reduces to
PoA(f, w, n) = inf
G∈Gˆnf,w
1
W (aopt)
,
s.t. Ui(ane) ≥ Ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
W (ane) = 1 .
(18)
Step 3: we relax the previous program as in the following
inf
G∈Gˆnf,w
1
W (aopt)
,
s.t.
∑
i∈N
(
Ui(a
ne)− Ui(aopti , ane−i)
) ≥ 0 ,
W (ane) = 1 ,
(19)
where the n equilibrium constraints (one per each player) have
been substituted by their sum. The main difficulty appearing in
(19) is in how to describe an instance G ∈ Gˆnf,w and on how
to compute the infimum over all such infinite instances. To
do so, we note that the objective function and the constraints
appearing in (19) can be encoded using only the parameters
{θ(a, x, b)}(a,x,b)∈I (see the proof). This trasnforms (19) to
the program (17) appearing in Theorem 2.
Step 4: We finally show that the relaxation introduced in Step
3 is tight. Thus, the price of anarchy is the solution of (17).
C. The dual reformulation
Thanks to strong duality, it suffices to solve the dual
program of (17) to compute PoA(f, w, n). For this purpose, let
IR := {(a, x, b) ∈ I s.t. a·x·b = 0 or a+ x+ b = n} ,
and note that IR contains all the integer points on the planes
a = 0, b = 0, x = 0, a + x + b = n bounding I. While the
dual program should feature two scalar decision variables and
O(n3) constraints, the following theorem shows how to reduce
the number of constraints to only |IR| = 2n2 + 1. The goal is
to progress towards an explicit expression for PoA(f, w, n).
Theorem 3 (Dual reformulation of PoA). Let w ∈ Rn>0 be
a welfare basis function, and let f ∈ Rn.
i) If f(1) ≤ 0, then PoA(f, w, n) = 0 for any n ∈ N.
ii) If instead f(1) > 0, n ∈ N, then PoA(f, w, n) = 1/W ?,
where W ? is the (finite) value of the following program
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. w(b+x)−µw(a+x)+λ[af(a+x)− bf(a+x+1)]≤0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR.
(20)
The proof of the previous theorem (reported in the Ap-
pendix) suggests that a further simplification can be made
when f(j) is non-increasing for all j. In this case the number
of constraints reduces to (n+ 1)2 − 1, as detailed next.
Corollary 1. Let w ∈ Rn>0 be a welfare basis function, and
let f ∈ Rn with f(1) > 0.
i) If f(j) is non-increasing ∀j ∈ [n], then PoA(f, w, n) =
1/W ?, where
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[jf(j)− lf(j + 1)]
∀j, l ∈ [0, n], 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n,
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(n− l)f(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)]
∀j, l ∈ [0, n], j + l > n.
(21)
ii) If additionally f(j) ≥ w(j)j minl∈[n] l·f(1)w(l) , then
λ? = max
l∈[n]
w(l)
l · f(1) .
Mimicking the proof of the Corollary 1 (see the Appendix),
it is possible to obtain a similar result when f(j) is non-
decreasing. The result is not included due to space limitations.
Remark 1. If the optimal value λ? is known a priori, as in
the second statement of Corollary 1, the price of anarchy can
be computed explicitly from (21) as the maximum between n2
real numbers depending on the entries of f and w. To see this,
divide both sides of the constraints in (21) by w(j) for j 6= 0.
The solution is then found as the maximum of the resulting
right hand side, with a corresponding value of
W ? = max

max
1≤j+l≤n
j,l∈[0,n], j 6=0
w(l)
w(j) + λ
?
[
j f(j)w(j) − l f(j+1)w(j)
]
max
j+l>n
j,l∈[0,n]
w(l)
w(j) + λ
?
[
(n− l) f(j)w(j) − (n− j) f(j+1)w(j)
]
(22)
Equation (22) is reminiscent of the result obtained using a
very different approach in [41, Theorem 6] (limited to Shapley
value) and [29, Theorem 3] (limited to set covering problems).
We discuss further connections with these results in Part II.
V. OPTIMIZING THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
Given w, n, and a mechanism f = F(w), Theorem 3 and
Corollary 1 have reduced the computation of the price of anar-
chy to the solution of a tractable linear program. Nevertheless,
determining the mechanism that maximizes PoA(f, w, n),
i.e. devising the best mechanism, is also a tractable linear
program. The following theorem makes this clear.
Theorem 4 (Optimizing PoA is a linear program). Let w ∈
Rn>0 be a welfare basis function, n ∈ N. The design problem
arg max
f∈Rn
PoA(f, w, n)
is equivalent to the following LP in n+ 1 scalar unknowns
(fopt, µopt) ∈ arg min
f∈Rn
f(1)≥1, µ∈R
µ
s.t. w(b+ x)− µw(a+ x) + af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1) ≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR.
(23)
7The optimal price of anarchy is PoA(fopt, w, n) = 1/µopt.
The proof is reported in the Appendix.
Remark 2. The importance of this results stems from its
applicability for the game design procedure outlined in the
Introduction. As a matter of fact, Theorem 4 allows to compute
the optimal mechanism, for any given welfare basis function,
and thus to solve the utility design problem. Applications of
these results are presented in Part II.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by resource allocation problems arising in mul-
tiagent and networked systems, we showed how to provide
a priori performance guarantees for distributed algorithms
based on a game theoretic approach. With this respect, the
paper contains two fundamental results. First, we showed that
computing the price of anarchy for the considered class of
resource allocation problems (and thus the approximation ratio
of any algorithm capable of determining a Nash equilibrium)
is equivalent to solving a tractable linear program. Second, we
showed how to select utility functions so as to maximize such
efficiency measure by means of a tractable linear program.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof.
Claim i). Let G = (N,R,A, {Wr}r∈R, {F ′(Wr)}r∈R) be a
game in GF ′ , and G = (N,R,A, {Wr}r∈R, {F(Wr)}r∈R)
be the corresponding game in the class of games GF . Observe
that, if every game G′ ∈ GF ′ is smooth with parameters
(λ, µ), then every game G ∈ GF is also smooth with the
same parameters. Indeed, if G′ is (λ, µ)-smooth, we have that∑
i∈N
U ′i(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a), ∀a, a′ ∈ A.
Thus, the corresponding game G is (λ, µ)-smooth, since∑
i∈N
Ui(a
′
i, a−i) ≥
∑
i∈N
U ′i(a
′
i, a−i) ≥ λW (a′)− µW (a),
for all a, a′ ∈ A, where we used the fact that Ui(a) ≥ U ′i(a)
for all i ∈ N, a ∈ A, and G ∈ GF (by assumption).
This shows that the set of parameters (λ, µ) feasible for
the program defining RPoA(F ′,W) is also feasible for the
program defining RPoA(F ,W). It follows that
RPoA(F ′,W) ≤ RPoA(F ,W).
Claim ii). If the utility functions do not satisfy (12), then
the smoothness framework does not even apply. Hence we
must consider mechanisms whose corresponding utilities sat-
isfy (12). In this respect, thanks to the result in (13), it is
never advantageous to lower the utilities from their budget
balanced level. Thus, the best bound on the price of anarchy
achievable using a smoothness argument is attained with
a budget balanced mechanism. In this respect, the unique
mechanism satisfying (12) with equality is Fes(Wr) = f esr ,
f esr (j) = Wr(j)/j for all j ∈ N. To see that Fes satisfies the
required property note that∑
i∈N
Ui(a) =
∑
i∈N
∑
r∈ai
f esr (|a|r) =
∑
r∈∪iai
|a|rf esr (|a|r) = W (a).
The fact that Fes is the unique such mechanism is because
any budget-balanced mechanism F(Wr) = fr must satisfy∑
i∈N
Ui(a) =
∑
r∈∪iai
|a|rfr(|a|r) =
∑
r∈∪iai
w(|a|r) = W (a),
for all allocations, for all instances. Thus, it suffices to consider
instances where only one resource is present and shared by all
agents. Since the number of agents is arbitrary, this implies
|a|rfr(|a|r) = w(|a|r) ∀ |a|r ∈ N ,
which is satisfied only by fr = Fes(Wr).
Claim iii). Thanks to the previous claim, any mechanism
F for which the smoothness framework applies (i.e., any
mechanism whose corresponding utilities satisfies (12)) must
satisfy RPoA(F ,W) ≤ RPoA(Fes,W). Thus, we only need
to show that RPoA(Fes) = 1/2. For the mechanism Fes,
[29, Theorem 2] shows that (9) holds with λ = 1 and
µ = 1 − 1/n, over all possible instances games where the
number of agents is upper bounded by n. Since we have not
posed any limitations on n until now, taking the limit n→∞
gives µ = 1, corresponding to RPoA(Fes) ≥ 1/2. To show
that there is not better pair (λ, µ) we show that the price of
anarchy is exactly 1/2. To do so, consider the instance G
proposed in [42, Figure 5] and observe that W (aopt) = 2−1/n
while W (ane) = 1. Taking the limit as n → ∞ gives
RPoA(Fes,W) ≤ PoA(Fes,W) ≤ 1/2. Since the lower and
the upper bound for RPoA(Fes,W) match, we conclude that
RPoA(Fes,W) = 1/2. The second inequality is shown upon
observing that PoA(F?) = 1− 1/e, thanks to [29].
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. The proof makes the steps 1-4 introduced in Subsection
IV-B formal, with particular attention to the steps 3-4. As al-
ready clarified in the opening of Subsection IV-B, we consider
only games G ∈ Gnf,w with exactly n agents, without loss of
generality. Additionally, we focus on the case of f(1) > 0.
The case of f(1) ≤ 0 is shown separately in Lemma 1.
Step 1. We intend to show that the price of anarchy computed
over G ∈ Gnf,w is the same of the price of anarchy computed
over a reduced set of games. Consider a game G ∈ Gnf,w and
denote with ane the corresponding worst-performing equilib-
rium (as measured by W ) and with aopt an optimal allocation
of G. For every such game G, we construct a new game
Gˆ, identical to G in everything but the allocation sets. The
allocation sets of the game Gˆ are defined as Aˆi = {anei , aopti }
for all i ∈ N , that is, the allocation set of every player in
Gˆ contains only two allocations: an optimal allocation, and
the worst-performing equilibrium of G. Observe that G and
Gˆ have the same price of anarchy, i.e.,
mina∈NE(G)W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
=
mina∈NE(Gˆ)W (a)
maxa∈AˆW (a)
.
8With slight abuse of notation we write Gˆ(G) to describe the
game Gˆ constructed from G as just discussed, and with Gˆnf,w
the class of games Gˆnf,w := {Gˆ(G) ∀G ∈ Gnf,w}. Observe
that Gˆnf,w ⊆ Gnf,w (by definition) and since for every game
G ∈ Gnf,w, it is possible to construct a game Gˆ ∈ Gˆnf,w with
the same price of anarchy, it follows that PoA(f, w, n) can be
equivalently computed only using games in Gˆnf,w, i.e.,
PoA(f, w, n) = inf
Gˆ∈Gˆnf,w
(
mina∈NE(Gˆ)W (a)
maxa∈AW (a)
)
.
Step 2. Lemma 2 ensures that for any game G ∈ Gnf,w, and
thus for any game Gˆ ∈ Gˆnf,w, the equilibrium configuration
ane has strictly positive welfare W (ane). Therefore, for every
fixed game Gˆ ∈ Gˆnf,w, one can construct a corresponding game
G˜ identical to Gˆ in everything but the value of the resources.
Each resource r that was associated with a value of vr in the
original game Gˆ is now associated with a value vr/W (ane)
in the new game G˜. Correspondingly, since that the welfare
has the form
W (a) =
∑
r∈∪iai
vrw(|a|r), (24)
a generic allocation a ∈ A that generated a welfare of
W (a) as in (24) for the original game Gˆ, now generates a
welfare of W (a)/W (ane) for the new game G˜. In particular,
the allocation ane generates a welfare of 1 for the new
game G˜. The procedure just introduced simply scales the
value of the welfare in all the allocations of Gˆ by the very
same coefficient. Thus ane remains the worst-performing Nash
equilibrium for the new game G˜. Similarly aopt remains an
optimal allocation for G˜. Therefore the game G˜ must have
the same price of anarchy of Gˆ. In addition, observe that
{Gˆ ∈ Gˆnf,w s.t. W (ane) = 1} ⊆ Gˆnf,w. Hence, using an
identical reasoning as the one carried out in Step 1, it follows
that the class of games Gˆ ∈ Gˆnf,w has the same price of anarchy
of the subclass where we additionally constraint W (ane) = 1.
Therefore, the price of anarchy can be computed as
PoA(f, w, n) = inf
Gˆ∈Gˆnf,w
1
W (aopt)
,
s.t. Ui(ane) ≥ Ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
W (ane) = 1 .
Step 3. First observe, from the last equation, that PoA(f) =
1/W ?, where
W ? := sup
Gˆ∈Gˆnf,w
W (aopt) ,
s.t. Ui(ane) ≥ Ui(aopti , ane−i) ∀i ∈ N ,
W (ane) = 1 .
(25)
We relax the previous program as in the following
V ? := sup
Gˆ∈Gˆnf,w
W (aopt) ,
s.t.
∑
i∈N
(
Ui(a
ne)− Ui(aopti , ane−i)
) ≥ 0 ,
W (ane) = 1 ,
(26)
where the n equilibrium constraints (one per each player)
have been substituted by their sum. We now show that V ?
appearing in (26) can be computed as
V ? = max
θ(a,x,b)
∑
a,x,b
w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b)
s.t.
∑
a,x,b
[af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0,∑
a,x,b
w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1,
θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0, ∀(a, x, b) ∈ I.
(27)
Towards this goal, we introduce the variables θ(a, x, b) with
(a, x, b) ∈ I. This parametrization has been used to study
covering problems in [43], and will be used here to efficiently
represent the quantities appearing in (26). To begin with, recall
that each feasible set is composed of only two allocations, that
is Aˆi = {anei , aopti }. For notational convenience, we let
• xr ∈ [0, n] denote the number of agents selecting re-
source r ∈ R in both the equilibrium ane and the optimal
allocation aopt, i.e.,
xr = |{i ∈ N : r ∈ anei ∩ aopti }|;
• ar + xr ∈ [0, n] denote the number of agents selecting
resource r ∈ R in the equilibrium allocation ane, i.e.,
ar + xr = |{i ∈ N : r ∈ anei }|;
• br + xr ∈ [0, n] denote the number of agents selecting
resource r ∈ R in the optimal allocation aopt, i.e.,
br + xr = |{i ∈ N : r ∈ aopti }|.
Finally, for each tuple (a, x, b) ∈ I, we defineR(a, x, b) as the
set containing all the resources r ∈ R that are selected exactly
by a+ x agents at the equilibrium, b+ x at the optimum, of
which x agents are selecting r ∈ R both at the equilibrium
and at the optimum. Formally, for each (a, x, b) ∈ I, let
R(a, x, b)={r∈R : ar+xr=a+x, br+xr=b+x, xr=x}.
Correspondingly, for each (a, x, b) ∈ I, we define θ(a, x, b) ≥
0 as the sum of the values of the resources in R(a, x, b), i.e.,
θ(a, x, b) =
∑
r∈R(a,x,b)
vr.
In the following we show how these (n+ 1)(n+ 2)(n+ 3)/6
variables suffice to fully describe the terms appearing in
(26). Indeed, using the notation previously introduced and the
definition of the welfare function, it is possible to write
W (ane)=
∑
r∈R
vrw(ar + xr) =
n∑
a+x=1
w(a+ x)
 ∑
r∈R
ar+xr=a+x
vr

=
∑
a,x,b
w(a+ x)
 ∑
r∈R(a,x,b)
vr
=∑
a,x,b
w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b),
9and similarly for W (aopt), with br+xr in place of ar+xr, i.e.,
W (aopt) =
∑
a,x,b
w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b).
We now move the attention to the terms appearing in the
relaxed equilibrium constraint. Note that
∑
i∈N Ui(a
ne) =∑
r∈R vr(ar +xr)f(ar +xr). Thus, following the same steps
as in the derivation of W (ane) with (ar + xr)f(ar + xr) in
place of w(ar + xr) gives∑
i∈N
Ui(a
ne) =
∑
a,x,b
(a+ x)f(a+ x)θ(a, x, b).
Finally, with a similar reasoning we obtain∑
i∈N
Ui(a
opt
i , a
ne
−i)=
∑
r∈R
vr [xrf(ar + xr) + brf(ar + xr + 1)]
=
∑
a,x,b
[xf(a+ x)+bf(a+ x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b).
It follows that
∑
i∈N
(
Ui(a
ne)− Ui(aopti , ane−i)
) ≥ 0 becomes∑
i∈N
(
Ui(a
ne)− Ui(aopti , ane−i)
)
=
∑
a,x,b
[(a+x)f(a+x)−xf(a+x)− bf(a+x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b)
=
∑
a,x,b
[af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)] θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0 .
Substituting these expressions in (26), one gets
V ? = sup
θ(a,x,b)
∑
a,x,b
w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b)
s.t.
∑
a,x,b
[af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)]θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0,∑
a,x,b
w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1,
θ(a, x, b) ≥ 0, ∀(a, x, b) ∈ I.
To transform the latter expression in (27) it suffices to show
that the sup is attained. To see this observe that the objec-
tive function is continuous and that the decision variables
{θ(a, x, b)}(a,x,b)∈I live in a compact space. Indeed θ(a, x, b)
is constrained to the positive orthant for all (a, x, b) ∈ I.
Additionally, each decision variable with a + x 6= 0 is upper
bounded due to the constraint W (ane) = 1, i.e.,∑
(a,x,b)∈I
a+x≥1
w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1 ,
where w(j) 6= 0 by assumption. Finally, the decision variables
left, i.e. those of the form θ(0, 0, b), b ∈ [n] are upper bounded
due to the equilibrium constraint, which can be rewritten as∑
b∈[n]
bf(1)θ(0, 0, b) ≤
∑
(a,x,b)∈I
a+x≥1
[af(a+x)−bf(a+x+1)]θ(a, x, b),
where f(1) 6= 0 by assumption. This proves that V ? defined
in (26) is equal to the value of the program in (27), and shows,
in addition, that the value W ? is finite.
Step 4. Observe that V ? ≥ W ? by definition of V ?. In
addition, Lemma 3 shows that V ? ≤ W ?, so that V ? = W ?.
Thus, the price of anarchy is PoA(f, w, n) = 1/W ? where
W ? is equal to the value of the program in (27), which is
identical to the the desired expression for W ? in (17).
Lemma 1. For any welfare basis w, if f(1) ≤ 0, it holds
PoA(f, w, n) = 0, ∀n ∈ N. (28)
Proof. Consider a game with one agent, with resource set
R = {r1, r2} where vr1 > 0 and vr2 = 0. Now suppose the
action set of agent 1 is A1 = {{r1}, {r2}}. Regardless of the
specific value of f(1), a1 = {r2} is an equilibrium. Hence, the
price of anarchy of this specific game is Wr2(1)/Wr1(1) = 0.
Consequently the price of anarchy over the class Gnf,w, that is
PoA(f, w, n), must be zero for any n ≥ 1.
Lemma 2. Assume f(1) > 0. For any game G ∈ Gnf,w, it is
W (ane) > 0 for all ane ∈ NE(G) .
Proof. Let us consider a fixed game G ∈ Gnf,w. By contradic-
tion, let us assume that W (ane) = 0 for some ane ∈ NE(G).
It follows that all the players must have distributed themselves
on resources that are either valued zero, or have selected the
empty set allocation (since w(j) > 0 when j ≥ 1). Hence,
their utility function must also evaluate to zero. However,
Definition 2 ensures that W (aopt) > 0. Thus, there must
exists a player p and a resource r with vr > 0 contained
in one of the allocations belonging to Ap (else we would
have W (aopt) = 0). Observe that no other player is currently
selecting this resource, otherwise it would be W (ane) > 0. If
player p was to deviate and select the allocation containing vr,
his utility would be strictly positive (since f(1) > 0). Thus
ane is not an equilibrium: a contradiction. Repeating the same
reasoning for all games G ∈ Gnf,w yields the claim.
Lemma 3. Consider W ? as in (25) and V ? as in (27). It
holds that V ? ≤W ?.
Proof. For any {θ(a, x, b)}(a,x,b)∈I feasible solution of (27),
we will construct an instance of game Gˆ satisfying the
constraints of (25) too. This allows to conclude that V ? ≤W ?.
Consider {θ(a, x, b)}(a,x,b)∈I a feasible tuple for (27) with
value v. For every (a, x, b) ∈ I and for each j ∈ [n] we
create a resource r(a, x, b, j) and assign to it the value of
θ(a, x, b)/n, i.e., vr(a,x,b,j) = θ(a, x, b)/n, ∀j ∈ [n]. We then
construct the game Gˆ by defining Aˆi = {anei , aopti } for all
i ∈ N , where the resources are assigned as follows
anei =∪nj=1{r(a, x, b, j) s.t. a+ x≥1 + ((j−i) modn)} ,
aopti =∪nj=1{r(a, x, b, j) s.t. b+ x≥1 + ((j−i+b) modn)}.
Informally this corresponds to the following construction: for
a fixed tuple (a, x, b), position the n resources r(a, x, b, j)
indexed by j ∈ [n] on a circle, as in Figure 2. As part of
the equilibrium allocation anei , agent i adds a + x of these
resources, starting from the resource r(a, x, b, j) with j =
i and moving clockwise. As part of the optimum allocation
aopti , agent i adds a total of b+x resources, starting from the
resource 1 + (i− 1− b) modn and moving clockwise. Repeat
the above construction running over all possible (a, x, b) ∈ I,
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where for each new (a, x, b) ∈ I new resources are added to
the agent’s equilibrium and optimal allocations, according to
the process just described.
..
.
n−1
n
1
2
3
4
5
...
..
.
n−1
n
1
2
3
4
5
...
Fig. 2. Construction of the agent’s equilibrium and optimal allocations.
Representation of the resources corresponding to a = 2, x = 1, b = 1. In
the figures above the n resources {r(2, 1, 1, j)}j∈[n] are denoted by white
circles, marked with the corresponding index j, and positioned on a ring. As
part of the equilibrium allocation (top figure) each agent adds a + x = 3
resources. In particular, agent 1 adds the resources with j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
(represented by the blue set); agent 2 adds the resources with j ∈ {2, 3, 4};
agent 3 adds the resources with j ∈ {3, 4, 5}, etc. As part of the optimal
allocation (bottom figure) each agent adds b+x = 2 resources. In particular,
agent 1 adds the resources with j ∈ {n, 1} (represented by the blue set);
agent 2 adds the resources with j ∈ {1, 2}; agent 3 adds the resources with
j ∈ {2, 3}, etc. Observe how all resources are selected by exactly a+x = 3
(resp. b + x = 2) agents at the equilibrium (resp. optimum). Finally note
that x = 1 resources are shared between the equilibrium and the optimal
allocation of each agent.
We begin by showing W (ane) = 1 and W (aopt) = v.
Observe that for any fixed resource r(a,x,b,j) (i.e. for every
fixed tuple (a, x, b, j)), there are exactly a + x (resp. b + x)
players selecting r(a,x,b,j) in the equilibrium allocation (resp.
optimum). It follows that
W (ane) =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
a+x>0
vr(a,x,b,j)w(a+ x)
=
∑
j∈[n]
∑
a+x>0
θ(a, x, b)
n
w(a+ x)
=
∑
a,x,b
w(a+ x)θ(a, x, b) = 1 ,
With an identical reasoning, one shows that
W (aopt) =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
b+x>0
vr(a,x,b,j)w(b+ x)
=
∑
a,x,b
w(b+ x)θ(a, x, b) = v .
Finally, we prove that ane is indeed an equilibrium, i.e. it
satisfies Ui(ane) − Ui(aopti , ane−i) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Towards
this goal, we recall that the game under consideration is a
congestion game with potential Φ : A → R≥0
Φ(a) =
∑
r∈∪iai
|a|r∑
k=1
vrf(k),
see [35]. It follows that Ui(ane)− Ui(aopti , ane−i) = Φ(ane)−
Φ(aopti , a
ne
−i) and so we equivalently prove that
Φ(ane)− Φ(aopti , ane−i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N .
Thanks to the previous observation, according to which every
resource r(a,x,b,j) is covered by exactly a + x players at the
equilibrium, we have
Φ(ane) =
∑
r∈∪ianei
vr
a+x∑
k=1
f(k) =
∑
j∈[n]
∑
a,x,b
θ(a, x, b)
n
a+x∑
k=1
f(k)
=
1
n
∑
a,x,b
n θ(a, x, b)
a+x∑
k=1
f(k) .
When moving from ane to (aopti , a
ne
−i) there are b resources
selected by one extra agent and a resources selected by one
less agent. The remaining n− a− b resources are chosen by
the same number of agents as in the equilibrium ane. Thus,
Φ(ane)− Φ(aopti , ane−i) =
=
1
n
∑
a,x,b
n θ(a, x, b)
a+x∑
k=1
f(k)+
− 1
n
∑
a,x,b
θ(a, x, b)
[
b
a+x+1∑
k=1
f(k) + a
a+x−1∑
k=1
f(k) + (n− a− b)
a+x∑
k=1
f(k)
]
=
1
n
∑
a,x,b
θ(a, x, b)
[
(a+ b)
a+x∑
k=1
f(k)− a
a+x−1∑
k=1
f(k)− b
a+x+1∑
k=1
f(k)
]
=
1
n
∑
a,x,b
θ(a, x, b)[af(a+ x)− bf(a+ x+ 1)] ≥ 0 ,
where the inequality holds because θ(a, x, b) is assumed
feasible for (27). This concludes the proof.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. The case of f(1) ≤ 0 was already shown in the proof
of Theorem 2. Thus, we restrict to f(1) > 0, and divide the
proof in two parts: Part a) writing the dual of the original
program in (17); Part b) showing that only the constraints
obtained for (a, x, b) ∈ IR are binding.
Part a). Upon stacking the decision variables θ(a, x, b) in
the vector y ∈ R`, ` = (n+ 3)(n+ 2)(n+ 1)/6, and after
properly defining the coefficients c, d, e ∈ R`, the program
(17) can be compactly written as
W ? = max
y
c>y
s.t. − e>y ≤ 0 , (λ)
d>y − 1 = 0 , (µ)
− y ≤ 0 . (ν)
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The Lagrangian function is defined for λ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0 as
L(y, λ, µ, ν) = c>y − λ(−e>y) − µ(d>y − 1) − ν>(−y) =
(c>+λe>+ ν −µd>)y+µ, while the dual function reads as
g(λ, µ, ν) = µ if c> + λe> + ν> − µd> = 0 ,
and it is unbounded elsewhere. Hence the dual program takes
the form
min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. c+ λe− µd ≤ 0 ,
which corresponds, in the original variables, to
W ? = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. w(b+x)−µw(a+x) +λ[af(a+x)− bf(a+x+ 1)]≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ I .
(29)
By strong duality4, the value of (17) matches (29). Finally,
observe that the dual is attained since the primal value is finite.
Part b). In this step we show that only the constraints with
(a, x, b) ∈ IR are necessary in (29), thus obtaining (20).
Observe that when (a, x, b) ∈ I and a+ x = 0, b can take
any value 1 ≤ b ≤ n, and these indices are already included
in IR. Similarly for the indices (a, x, b) ∈ I with b+ x = 0.
Thus, we focus on the remaining constraints, i.e. those with
a + x 6= 0 and b + x 6= 0. We change the coordinates from
the original indices (a, x, b) to (j, x, l), j := a+x, l := b+x.
The constraints in (29) now read as
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(j − x)f(j)− (l − x)f(j + 1)]
= w(l) + λ[jf(j)− lf(j + 1) + x(f(j + 1)− f(j))] ,
(30)
where (j, x, l) ∈ Iˆ and Iˆ = {(j, x, l) ∈ N3≥0 s.t. 1 ≤ j −
x+ l ≤ n, j ≥ x, l ≥ x, j, l 6= 0}. In the remaining of this
proof we consider j fixed, while l, x are free to move within
Iˆ. This corresponds to moving the indices in the rectangular
region defined by the blue and green patches in Figures 3, 4.
Observe that for j = n it must be l = x (since −x + l ≤ 0
and l − x ≥ 0), i.e., in the original coordinates b = 0, which
represents the segment on the plane b = 0 with a + x = n.
These indices already belong to IR. Thus, we consider the
case j 6= n and divide the reasoning in two parts.
• Case of f(j + 1) ≤ f(j).
In the following we fix l as well (recall that we have
previously fixed j). This corresponds to considering points
on a black dashed line on the plane j = const in Figure 3).
The term f(j + 1) − f(j) is non-positive and so the most
binding constraint in (30) is obtained picking x as small as
possible. Since it must be x ≥ 0 and x ≥ j+ l−n, for fixed
j and l, we set x = max{0, j+ l−n}. In the following we
show that these constraints are already included in IR.
- When j + l ≤ n, i.e., when a + b + 2x ≤ n, it is x =
max{0, j+l−n} = 0. These indices correspond to points
4The primal LP (17) is always feasible, since θ(0, 1, 0) = 1/w(1),
θ(a, x, b) = 0 ∀ (a, x, b) ∈ I \ (0, 1, 0) satisfies all the constraints in (17)
on the plane x = 0, (1 ≤ a + b ≤ n) and so they are
already included in IR (white diamonds in Figure 3).
- When j + l > n, i.e., when a + b + 2x > n, it is x =
max{0, j+ l−n} = j+ l−n, i.e., a+ b+x = n. These
indices correspond to points on the plane a+ b+ x = n,
which are included in IR too (black circles in Figure 3).
a
x
b
a+ x+ b
= n
l =
const
j = const,
j + l ≥ n
j = const,
j + l < n
Fig. 3. Indices representation for case a).
• Case of f(j + 1) > f(j).
In the following we fix l as well (recall that we have
previously fixed j). This corresponds to considering points
on a dashed black line on the plane plane j = const in
Figure 4). The term f(j + 1)− f(j) is positive and so the
most binding constraint in (30) is obtained picking x as large
as possible. Since it must be x ≤ l, x ≤ j and x ≤ j+ l−1,
we set x = min{j, l}. In the following we show that these
constraints are already included in (20).
- When j ≤ l i.e. when a ≤ b, it is x = min{j, l} = j, i.e.,
a = 0. These indices correspond to points on the plane
a = 0, (1 ≤ x+ b ≤ n) which are included in IR (white
diamonds in Figure 4).
- When j > l, i.e., when a > b, it is x = min{j, l} = l, i.e.,
b = 0. These indices correspond to points on the plane
b = 0, (1 ≤ a + b ≤ n) which are included in IR too
(black circles in Figure 4).
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof.
Claim i). Following the proof of Theorem 3 (Part b), we note
that if f(j) is non increasing for all j ∈ [n], the only binding
indices are those lying on the the two surfaces x = 0, 1 ≤
a+b ≤ n and a+x+b ≤ n. The surface x = 0, 1 ≤ a+b ≤ n
gives
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[jf(j)− lf(j + 1)] (31)
for 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n and j, l ∈ [0, n], where we have used the
same change of coordinates of the proof of Theorem 3 i.e.
j = a+ x, l = b+ x. The surface a+ x+ b = n gives
µw(n− b) = w(n− a) + λ[af(n− b)− bf(n− b+ 1)] ,
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a
x
b
a+ x+ b
= n
l =
const
j = const,
j ≥ l
j = const,
j ≤ l
Fig. 4. Indices representation for case b).
which can be written as
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(n− l)f(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)] , (32)
for j+l > n and j, l ∈ [0, n], where we have used j = a+x =
n − b, l = b + x = n − a. Thus, we conclude that (31) and
(32) are sufficient to describe the constraints in (20).
Claim ii). We first note that as a consequence of the assump-
tion
f(j) ≥ w(j)
j
min
l∈[n]
l · f(1)
w(l)
,
it follows that f(j) > 0 for all j ∈ [n], since w(l) > 0,
f(1) > 0. Thus we need not worry about the case of f(j) = 0
for j ∈ [n] in the remainder of the proof.
When j = 0 the constraints yield λ ≥ w(l)/(lf(1)) for
l ∈ [n]. Define
λ? = max
l∈[n]
w(l)
lf(1)
,
and observe that any feasible λ must satisfy λ ≥ λ?. These
constraints correspond to straight lines parallel to the µ axis.
To prove the claim, we show that the most binding con-
straints amongst all those in (21) with j 6= 0 are of the form
µ ≥ αλ + β, where α ≥ 0, i.e., the most binding constraints
are straight lines in the (λ, µ) plane pointing north-east. Thus,
the value of λ that minimizes µ is attained with λ as small as
possible, i.e., λ = λ?. See Figure 5 for an illustrative plot.
We now consider the case of l = 0, for which the constraints
yield µ ≥ λjf(j)/w(j), with j ∈ [n]. These constraints are
straight lines pointing north-east in the (λ, µ) plane due to
f(j)/w(j) ≥ 0 for j ≥ 1. We are thus left to check the
constraints with j 6= 0 and l 6= 0.
To do so, we prove that if one such constraint (identified by
the indices (j, l)) has negative slope, the constraint identified
with (j, 0) is more binding. This will conclude the proof, since
the constraint (j, 0) has non-negative slope, as just seen. We
split the reasoning depending on wether 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n or
j+l > n as the constraints in (21) have a different expression.
λ
µ
(λ?, µ?)
Feasible region
Constraints (0, l)
Constraints (j, 0)
Constraints (j, l)
with j, l 6= 0
Fig. 5. The three classes of constraints used in the proof of Corollary 1.
• Case of 1 ≤ j + l ≤ n: the constraints read as
µ ≥ w(l)
w(j)
+
λ
w(j)
[jf(j)− lf(j + 1)].
Observe that the case j = n, corresponds to l = 0 since
j + l ≤ n, and this case has already been discussed. Thus,
we consider the case j 6= n in the following. To complete the
reasoning we assume that the above constraint has negative
slope, that is jf(j)−lf(j+1) < 0, and show that the constraint
(j, 0) is more binding, i.e., that
λj
f(j)
w(j)
≥ w(l)
w(j)
+ λj
f(j)
w(j)
− λl f(j + 1)
w(j)
,
which is equivalent to showing
w(l)− λlf(j + 1) ≤ 0 . (33)
Since jf(j)− lf(j + 1) < 0, it follows that
l > j
f(j)
f(j + 1)
≥ j ,
by non-increasingness and positivity of f(j). Therefore
l ≥ j + 1. Consequently, w(l) ≤ (w(l)f(j + 1))/f(l), again
by non-increasingness and positivity of f(l). Using this, we
can bound the left hand side of (33) as
w(l)− λlf(j + 1) ≤
(
w(l)
f(l)
− λl
)
f(j + 1) .
By assumption f(j) ≥ w(j)j minl∈[n] l·f(1)w(l) for all j ∈ [n].
Setting j = l gives w(l)/f(l) ≤ l · maxl∈[n] w(l)/(lf(1)) =
lλ?. Therefore we conclude that (33) holds, since
w(l)−λlf(j+1)≤
(
w(l)
f(l)
− λl
)
f(j+1)≤(λ?−λ)lf(j+1)≤0,
where the last inequality holds since f(j+1) > 0 and λ ≥ λ?
for every feasible λ.
• Case of j + l > n: the constraints read as
µw(j) ≥ w(l) + λ[(n− l)f(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1)] .
Observe that if j = n, then the above constraint has non-
negative slope since l ≤ n and f(j + 1) = 0. Thus, in the
following we consider the case of j 6= n. To complete the
proof we assume that the above constraint has negative slope,
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that is (n− l)f(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1) < 0, and show that the
constraints (j, 0) is more binding, i.e., that
λj
f(j)
w(j)
≥ w(l)
w(j)
+ λ(n− l) f(j)
w(j)
− λ(n− j)f(j + 1)
w(j)
or equivalently
w(l) + λ(n− l − j)f(j)− λ(n− j)f(j + 1) ≤ 0. (34)
Observe that
λ(n− l − j)f(j)− λ(n− j)f(j + 1) =
= −lλf(j) + λ(n− j)(f(j)− f(j + 1))
≤ −lλf(j) + lλ(f(j)− f(j + 1))
= −lλf(j + 1) ,
where the inequality holds because f(j) − f(j + 1) ≥ 0 and
n − j < l since we are considering indices with j + l > n.
Thus the left hand side of (34) is upper bounded by
w(l)+λ(n−l−j)f(j)−λ(n−j)f(j+1) ≤ w(l)−lλf(j+1).
Therefore in the following we equivalently show that w(l)−
lλf(j + 1) ≤ 0. Since (n− l)f(j)− (n− j)f(j + 1) < 0, it
must be
n− j > f(j)
f(j + 1)
(n− l) > n− l,
by non-increasingness and positivity of f(j). Thus it must be
l ≥ j + 1. Since the equation we are left to show, i.e., w(l)−
lλf(j+1) ≤ 0, is identical to (33), and since again l ≥ j+1,
we can apply the same reasoning as in the case of 1 ≤ j+l ≤ n
and conclude.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof. For given f ∈ Rn, if f(1) ≤ 0, then PoA(f, w, n) = 0
(see Theorem 2), while if f(1) > 0 then PoA(f, w, n) > 0
(consequence of the fact that W ? in (17) if finite, see Theorem
2). Thus, any f with f(1) ≤ 0 can not be optimal. Therefore,
in the following we consider only f ∈ Rn with f(1) > 0. In
addition, Lemma 4 shows that the price of anarchy does not
change upon scaling f with a positive constant. Thus, without
loss of generality, we consider only mechanisms f = F(w)
satisfying f ∈ F , where
F = {f : [n]→ R s.t. f(1) ≥ 1}.
As a result of the above reasoning, determining the best
mechanism F(w) = f ∈ Rn is equivalent to determining
the best mechanism F(w) = f ∈ F . Nevertheless, for any
such f ∈ F , the price of anarchy can be computed using (20).
Therefore, devising the mechanism that maximizes the price
of anarchy is equivalent to determining f ∈ F minimizing
W ? defined in (20), i.e.,
arg min
f∈F
min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t.w(b+x)−µw(a+x) +λ[af(a+x)− bf(a+x+ 1)]≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR .
(35)
Lemma 5 shows that the latter program is well posed, in the
sense that minimum is attained for some f ∈ F with bounded
components.
The program in (35) is non linear, but the decision variables
λ and f always appear multiplied together. Thus, we define
f˜(j) := λf(j) for all j ∈ [0, n + 1] and observe that the
constraint obtained in (20) for (a, x, b) = (0, 0, 1) gives
f˜(1) = λf(1) ≥ 1, which also implies λ ≥ 1/f(1) > 0
since f(1) > 0. Folding the min operators gives
(f˜opt, µopt) ∈ arg min
f˜(1)≥1, µ∈R
µ
s.t. w(b+x)−µw(a+x) +af˜(a+x)− bf˜(a+x+ 1)≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR .
(36)
Finally, observe that f˜opt is also feasible for the original pro-
gram, since f˜opt(1) ≥ 1. Additionally, we note that f˜opt and
fopt give the same price of anarchy (since f˜opt = λoptfopt,
with λopt > 0, see Lemma 4). Thus f˜opt solving (36) must
be optimal and PoA(fopt) = 1/µopt.
Lemma 4. For any welfare basis w, any mechanism f =
F(w), and any n ∈ N, the price of anarchy PoA(f, w, n) is
invariant by scaling f with any positive constant α > 0, i.e.,
PoA(f, w, n) = PoA(α · f, w, n).
Proof. For any given game G ∈ Gnf,w, consider the corre-
sponding game Gˆ ∈ Gnα·f,w that is identical to G in everything,
but employs α · f in place of f . Observe that if aopt is
an optimal allocation for G, this must also be an optimal
allocation for Gˆ, since modifying f does not impact the
definition of the welfare, or the allocation sets. Additionally,
observe that any allocation ane that is an equilibrium for the
game G is also an equilibrium for the game Gˆ, and vice-
versa. This is because, whenever ane satisfies the equilibrium
condition for G, i.e.,∑
r∈anei
vrf(|ane|r)≥
∑
r∈ai
vrf(|(ai, ane−i)|r), ∀ai ∈ Ai, i∈N
it also satisfies the equilibrium conditions for Gˆ, i.e.,∑
r∈anei
vrα·f(|ane|r)≥
∑
r∈ai
vrα·f(|(ai, ane−i)|r), ∀ai ∈ Ai, i∈N
and vice-versa, due to the fact that multiplying by α > 0 does
not change the sign of the inequalities. Thus the games G and
Gˆ have the same price of anarchy. Repeating the reasoning
over all games G ∈ Gnf,w gives the claim for the whole class.
Lemma 5. The minimum appearing in (35) is attained by
some mechanism F(w) = f ∈ F .
Proof. In the following, we show that the infimum
inf
f∈F
min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t.w(b+x)−µw(a+x) +λ[af(a+x)− bf(a+x+ 1)]≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR
(37)
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is attained by some mechanism with bounded components, and
therefore by f ∈ F . Since the price of anarchy of anarchy of
f and of α · f with α > 0 is the same (see Lemma 4), (37) is
equivalent to
inf
f∈F
f(1)=1
min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t.w(b+x)−µw(a+x) +λ[af(a+x)− bf(a+x+ 1)]≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR .
(38)
Therefore, in the following we consider a given f ∈ F with
f(1) = 1, and construct from it fM as follows: fM (j) = M ,
with M ∈ R for some fixed j ∈ [2, n], while fM exactly
matches f for the remaining components. We then show
that there exists M+ ≥ 0 such that PoA(fM , w, n) <
PoA(f, w, n) for any M ≥M+. Similarly, we show that there
exists M− ≤ 0 such that PoA(fM , w, n) < PoA(f, w, n)
for any M ≤ M−. Thus fM can not attain the infimum for
M ≥M+ or M ≤M− as the corresponding f would give a
better price of anarchy. Repeating this reasoning for any f ∈ F
with f(1) = 1, and for any possible j ∈ [2, n] one concludes
that the distribution rule achieving the infimum in (38) can
not be unbounded along a single direction. With an identical
argument, one can show that the distribution rule achieving
the infimum in (38) can not be unbounded along two or more
directions simultaneously. This provides the desired result.
To conclude we show that ∃M+ ≥ 0, ∃M− ≤ 0 such that
PoA(fM , w, n) < PoA(f, w, n) for all M ≥M+ and for all
M ≤ M−. To do so, observe that the price of anarchy of
f ∈ F is PoA(f, w, n) = 1/W ?, where W ? is the solution
to the primal problem in (17). As shown in Theorem 2, it is
W ? < +∞ and so PoA(f, w, n) > 0 strictly. On the other
hand, thanks to Theorem 3, the price of anarchy of fM can
be computed for any M as PoA(fM , w, n) = 1/W ?M , where
W ?M = min
λ∈R≥0, µ∈R
µ
s.t. w(b+x)−µw(a+x) +λ[afM (a+x)− bfM (a+x+ 1)]≤ 0
∀(a, x, b) ∈ IR.
First, observe that any feasible λ satisfies λ ≥ 1fM (1) = 1, else
the constraints obtained form the previous linear program with
a = x = 0, b = 1 would be infeasible. Further, consider the
constraints with b = 0, x = 0, a = j ≥ 2. They amount to
µ ≥ λjfM (j) ≥ j
fM (1)
fM (j) = jM ,
so that
PoA(fM ) =
1
W ?M
≤ 1
jM
.
Thus, it is possible to make PoA(fM , w, n) arbitrarily close
to zero, by selecting M sufficiently large, i.e., ∃M+ ≥ 0 such
that PoA(fM , w, n) < PoA(f, w, n) for all M ≥ M+, since
PoA(f, w, n) is bounded away from zero, as argued above.
Similarly, consider the constraints a = 0, b = 1, x = j−1 ≥ 1
µ ≥ w(j)− λfM (j)
w(j − 1) ,
from which be obtain
µ ≥ w(j)
w(j − 1) −
λM
w(j − 1)
(M<0)
≥ w(j)
w(j − 1) −
M
w(j − 1) ,
where the last inequality holds only for a negative value of M ,
since λ ≥ 1. Thus, it is possible to make the term − Mw(j−1)
arbitrarily large by selecting M to be a large negative number,
so that PoA(fM , w, n) is arbitrarily close to zero. Formally,
∃M− ≤ 0 such that PoA(fM , w, n) < PoA(f, w, n) for all
M ≤M−, since PoA(f, w, n) is bounded away from zero. A
similar reasoning applies for a given mechanism with two or
more unbounded components.
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